



Many want to know what bitcoin is and how it works. But bitcoin
is as complex as it is controversial, and relatively few have the techni-
cal background to understand it. In this paper, I oer an accessible
on-ramp for understanding bitcoin in the form of a model. My model
reveals both what bitcoin is and how it works. More specifically, it
reveals that bitcoin is a fictional substance in a massively coauthored
story on a network that automates and distributes jobs normally en-
trusted to centralized publishing institutions. My model therefore fal-
sifies a popular view according to which each bitcoin is a chunk of
code.
1 Introduction
During the Great Recession, a person or persons under the pseudonym
‘Satoshi Nakamoto’ created bitcoin, a new form of digital money. In an
announcement for bitcoin from February 2009, Satoshi [2009a] writes:
The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust
that’s required to make it work. The central bank must be
trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of fiat cur-
rencies is full of breaches of that trust. Banks must be trusted
to hold our money and transfer it electronically, but they lend it
out in waves of credit bubbles with barely a fraction in reserve.
Satoshi had seen how the banks partially responsible for the recession never-
theless received government bailouts. And he oered bitcoin as an antidote
to these unfair systems in which institutions receive public funds to avoid
the consequences of their irresponsible behavior.1
Now, a little over a decade later, governments worldwide have kicked
their money printers into high gear to stave o a pandemic-induced depres-
sion. And, once again, they have bailed out companies with questionable
*For comments and discussion, thanks to audiences at Texas A&M (2019 Conference of
the Society for Philosophy and Technology) and Pittsburgh (2019 Midwest Annual Work-
shop in Metaphysics), as well as Wassim Alsindi, Andrew Bailey, Nathan Ballantyne, Nic
Carter, James Chiang, Judith Crane, Billy Dunaway, Alicia Finch, Rhys Lindmark, Matthew
McKeever, Santiago Meijia, Martin Peterson, Bradley Rettler, Noël Saenz, Edmund Schus-
ter, Erica Shumener, Kevin Vallier, Brandon Warmke, Vi Wysong, and students in my Fall
2018 seminar on idealism.
1 I use the singular masculine pronoun since Satoshi chose a traditionally male name.
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business practices. Through both fiscal and monetary policy, governments
and central banks continue to debase our currencies and socialize the losses
of undeserving corporations.
Although Satoshi has since disappeared without a trace, his creation re-
mains. In addition to being highly divisible, easily portable, and, under best
practices, eectively unseizable, bitcoin is also censorship-resistant because
its peer-to-peer network transfers value without the intermediaries that close
accounts, block transactions, and engage in financial surveillance.2 Bitcoin
has no CEO or central bank. No corporations with skilled lobbyists can
situate themselves near its monetary spigot to reap unjust rewards. Nor
can anyone eect a high rate of inflation, a practice that disproportionately
helps the rich.3 Instead, its permissionless system issues new bitcoin fairly
to those who help secure the network along a fixed, disinflationary issuance
schedule through the year 2140.
As governments and corporations begin to roll out their own digital cur-
rencies, bitcoin will remain an important alternative, especially to any such
currencies used as tools of financial surveillance or those subject to negative
interest rates.4 Despite bitcoin’s popularity and increasing importance, few
understand how bitcoin works. This is unsurprising since it has many mov-
ing and mathematically complex parts with obscure labels.5 Some need
little more than a place to put bitcoin on their cognitive maps. But as bit-
coin’s profile rises in response to global events, many seek the answers to
two questions, in particular:
Philosophical Question. What sort of thing is bitcoin?
Functional Question. How does bitcoin work?
Many questions about bitcoin belong to the domain of cryptography or
computer science or economics. Bitcoin experts wield considerable knowl-
edge in these fields and their answers to these questions illuminate bitcoin’s
fundamentals. But the Philosophical Question belongs to neither cryptog-
raphy nor computer science nor economics nor to a triumvirate of all three.
Although answering the question requires some knowledge of these fields,
the question is essentially a philosophical one. So we also need the dis-
ciplinary tools of philosophy to reveal the answer.6 Since we have yet to
2 Cryptocurrencies are censorship-resistant to varying degrees. For a sustained discus-
sion of cryptocurrencies generally, and their relationship to philosophy, politics, and
economics, see Bailey et al..
3 See Easterly and Fischer [1999], Li et al. [2002], and Albanesi [2007, 1090-1093].
4 In a recent survey, the Bank of International Settlements [2020, 3] found that 80%
of respondent central banks are “engaged in some sort of work” on developing their
own digital currencies. For recent discussion on these developments, see Ki et al.
[2020], Lannquist et al. [2020], Auer and Böhme [2020], Meaning et al. [2018], and
Davoodalhosseini [2018].
5 Sometimes, descriptions of those parts obscure or stretch the truth. See Walch [2016,
2017].
6 ‘What is bitcoin?’ is what Nathan Ballantyne [2019, 6] calls a hybridized question, one
best “addressed and answered by combining evidence and techniques from two or
more fields.”
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marshal these tools in this way, we have not yet fully understood what bit-
coin truly is.7
Satoshi once opined that “writing a description for this [bitcoin] thing
for general audiences is bloody hard. There’s nothing to relate it to.”8 Ten
years later, bitcoin still suers from an open exposition problem—we lack
a totally perspicuous explanation of what it is and how it works.9 Such
an explanation remains elusive partly because we’ve never marshaled the
philosophical tools required to explain bitcoin. But we need more than the
tools alone. We also need to use those tools within a particular method of
explanation.
Why do we also need a special method of explanation? Even with the
required tools, bitcoin’s close relationship with its components makes it dif-
ficult to gain much traction on the Philosophical and Functional Questions.
Since bitcoin’s components help make it what it is, understanding bitcoin is
dicult without understanding how it works. This line of thought suggests
that we address the Functional Question first: maybe once we understand
the components, we will understand bitcoin. Unfortunately, the jargon for
the components obscures how they make bitcoin what it is.
So perhaps we should begin with the Philosophical Question. Indeed,
I’m convinced that without an understanding of what bitcoin is in the first
place, we lack the proper framework for understanding what exactly its
components do. This line of thought suggests that we should seek to un-
derstand bitcoin first before we try to understand its complex machinery,
contrary to our initial line of thought. So it looks like we’re in a pickle:
answering either the Functional or the Philosophical Question seems to re-
quire an answer to the other. We could easily spin our wheels approaching
these questions one at a time.
We can gain traction, however, by approaching the Philosophical and
Functional Questions more or less simultaneously. We can use what Michael
Weisberg [2007, 209] calls a modeling strategy, “the indirect theoretical inves-
tigation of a real world phenomenon using a model.” By modeling, we can
come to understand a phenomenon without investigating it directly.10 Us-
7 Though some philosophers have written about bitcoin, none have done so primarily
as an exercise in metaphysics, standardly conceived, as I do here. For example, Rei-
jers and Coeckelbergh [2018] consider how blockchain technologies might shape our
social world and frame a technology’s societal eects as aecting this or that narra-
tive in a wider ontology of narratives. An examination of the possible interpersonal
and societal eects of a technology has great value. But it brings us no closer to un-
derstanding what bitcoin is in itself. Bjerg [2016] and Velasco [2017] also engage in
dierent projects.
8 Nakamoto [2010].
9 I borrow this notion of an open exposition problem from Chow [2009]. Thanks to
Matthew McKeever for helping me frame the issue in this way.
10 Along similar lines, Swan and De Filippi [2017, 607] invite philosophers to use “con-
ceptual metaphors” to help others understand the complicated nature of blockchain
technology. In this vein, they briefly cast bitcoin as the Napster of money. However,
Napster had a CEO and used centralized servers to pair file-sharers. Thus, it was ex-
actly the kind of vulnerable intermediary with a central authority that bitcoin avoids
by design. When Satoshi [2009b] announced the first release of the bitcoin software to
a cryptography mailing list on January 8, 2009, he says that the system is “completely
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ing Weisberg’s account of modeling as a guide, I will construct a model,
analyze its properties, and then show that many of those same properties
apply to bitcoin. With simpler components and more descriptive labels, my
model serves as an accessible on-ramp for understanding both what bitcoin
is, metaphysically, and how it ultimately works.11 The model involves a
computer network designed to protect against internal abuse and external
attack and on which many coauthors continuously write a simple fictional
story.12
Although the model serves as an accessible on-ramp for understand-
ing bitcoin, I don’t solve bitcoin’s open exposition problem. I’m writing,
first of all, for other philosophers. I make controversial claims which re-
quire argument, and the arguments themselves require some philosophical
background to assess. But I’m not writing for philosophers alone. I provide
resources that may someday help others solve the open exposition problem.
I also hope, perhaps in vain, that my exposition is perspicuous enough that
those new to bitcoin will gain deep levels of understanding and appreciation
for it, even if certain parts of the exposition prove obscure or dicult.
Let’s begin with a preview. In the next section, I briefly explain the
modeling strategy. In Section 3, I motivate aspects of my model by looking
at an infamous case of coauthorship. In Sections 4 and 5, I describe and
analyze the model. Then, in Section 6, I compare the model to the bitcoin
network. The comparison reveals that bitcoin is a fictional substance in an
on-going story that traverses a massively coauthored digital book otherwise
known as the blockchain.
2 Modeling
Modeling both simplifies the study of a complex phenomenon and helps
its practitioners sidestep false but compelling views about it.13 The case
of the modeling mathematician, Vito Volterra, exemplifies both benefits.
During World World I, although fishing slowed in the Adriatic Sea, post-
war populations of sharks and other predators increased while post-war
populations of cod and other prey decreased.14 The situation puzzled many.
Instead of formulating and testing hypotheses directly, Volterra constructed
and analyzed a simple model involving two populations, predator and prey,
with certain stipulated mathematical properties. Volterra’s mathematical
model predicted that heavy fishing favored the prey and light fishing favored
the predator, contrary to what many expected. Because Volterra’s model
and the aquatic life in the Adriatic were relevantly similar, he drew the
surprisingly correct conclusion that pulling fewer cod from the sea led the
decentralized with no server or central authority.”
11 As I’ll explain later, good models simplify aspects of the target phenomena. So we
shouldn’t expect to find every important aspect of the target phenomena in the model
itself. My model serves primarily to answer the Philosophical and Functional Ques-
tions to the neglect of some other questions.
12 For earlier approaches along similar lines, see Sztorc [2014] and McKeever [2018].
13 See Godfrey-Smith [2006a], Paul [2012, 14], Weisberg [2007, 208].
14 Here, I rely on the details in Weisberg [2007].
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sea to have fewer cod and that a return to pre-war fishing levels would bring
back the pre-war proportions of prey and predator.
In Weisberg [2007, 2013], Volterra’s case illustrates the three main stages
of modeling:
Stage 1: Construction. The theorist does not investigate the target
phenomenon directly but first constructs a model with certain stipu-
lated properties.15
Stage 2: Analysis. The theorist studies the model itself to determine
what is true of it.16
Stage 3: Assessment. The theorist assesses whether the model is
suciently similar to the target phenomenon. If it is, the theorist
maps aspects of the model onto the target phenomenon to reveal that
some truths about the model are true about the target phenomenon.17
Thus, modelers can gain understanding of a phenomenon indirectly by in-
vestigating a simpler but relevantly similar system. But a word of caution:
the very simplicity of a model that aids discovery also arises from a loss of
information by abstraction. By design, successful models don’t capture all
aspects of their target phenomena. And my model also achieves simplic-
ity through abstraction. When we later assess my model, I will highlight
several ways in which it simplifies in order to answer the Philosophical and
Functional Questions.
My target phenomenon is bitcoin, not fish populations in the Adriatic
Sea. But bitcoin is equally ripe for modeling. First, instead of investigating
bitcoin and its mathematically complex machinery, we can examine a sim-
pler and highly idealized model. Second, by examining this simpler model,
we will sidestep the initially plausible but wrong view that bitcoin is code.18
Overall, then, we can use a model to bootstrap into a working knowledge of
bitcoin and thereby enjoy both the ease of theft and goods of honest toil.19
I will devote a section in the paper to each stage, from Sections 4 through
6. My model is an imagined network of coauthors who write an on-going
fictional story, chapter by chapter, about passing bread from basket to bas-
ket. Although I will stipulate many features of the model, we have good
reason to stipulate these features beyond the fact that I obviously have an
eye on using them to model bitcoin. For the network is designed to mitigate
15 Weisberg [2007, 209, 222-224].
16 Weisberg [2007, 209, 222-224].
17 Weisberg [2007, 209-10, 224-226].
18 I say more about the view that bitcoin is code in Sections 6 and 7.
19 One might object that, as a scientific tool, modeling is ill-suited for philosophy, in
general, and metaphysics, in particular. Paul [2012], Godfrey-Smith [2006b], and
Williamson [2017] would disagree. I find their positions plausible, but the adequacy
of my modeling strategy here does not hang on whether they are right. I will use
what Weisberg [2013, 19-25] might call a hypothetical concrete model, a concrete struc-
ture that I describe but never actually build. (Compare Giere [1988].) I will argue that,
if my model were built, something in it would fall under a certain metaphysical cat-
egory. Then, since that thing would be suciently similar to something in the target
phenomenon, the thing in the target phenomenon also falls under the same category.
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various challenges with coauthorship, peer review, and publishing. Before
I present the model, let’s review these challenges.
3 Coauthorship Problems
Once, someone invited Alexandre Dumas to coauthor. He reportedly replied,
“Why should I wish to quarrel with you?”20 Dumas knew all too well the
challenges of coauthorship. To start, potential coauthors begin with no
clear protocol for who does what. So they must first divvy up tasks, includ-
ing the task of divvying up tasks. Now, as coauthors, we want to assign
tasks fairly, but we also want to maximize the chances for success. And
fairness and success sometimes pull in opposite directions, especially in
our messy world of egos, feelings, and diering standards for both fairness
and success.
Yet any number of reasons might prevent coauthors from completing
tasks, no matter how carefully we distribute them. Even with stringent
safeguards and a clear governance model, widening a project’s network
of coauthors would seem to increase the likelihood of disagreement, the
involvement of incompetent or malicious actors, and, as a result, the likeli-
hood of failure itself.21 As you can imagine, then, mass coauthorship—or
hyperauthorship, as it is called22—presents incredible challenges. We will
soon design a system for hyperauthorship, a method for coauthoring on a
massive scale. This system will serve as our model for understanding bit-
coin. To further aid our design, we will now look at a case of coauthorship
gone awry.
In 1800, the second edition of Lyrical Ballads appeared with some ques-
tionable changes from the first edition two years prior. In the first edi-
tion, neither William Wordsworth’s nor Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s name
appeared on the cover, and the book opened with Coleridge’s “The Rime
of the Ancyent Marinere.” Soon after, in a letter to the publisher dated June
24th, 1799, Wordsworth opines that Coleridge’s opening poem had been “an
injury to the volume.”23 In the second edition a year later, Wordsworth ex-
cised another one of Coleridge’s poems, renamed and relegated the mariner
poem to the penultimate spot, and described that poem in the endnotes
as having “great defects.”24 Wordsworth kept the rest of Coleridge’s po-
ems simply for “variety” and attributed them generically to a “friend.”
The cover bore Wordsworth’s name alone. This episode provides a few
lessons—besides the obvious lesson that one should never collaborate with
20 Matthews [1890, 169].
21 Bozeman et al. [2015], Parker and Kingori [2016]. Relatedly, linguist Georey Pullman
[2016] has over 100 coauthored publications, enough to appreciate the diculties of
coauthoring without exaggerating them. He conjectures that the “worst-case diculty
of completing an academic work increases in proportion to Dn , where D is the degree
of diculty it would have had anyway and n is the number of authors.”
22 Cronin [2001].
23 Barker [2002, 60].
24 This comment appears on an unnumbered page in the end notes of Wordsworth and
Coleridge [1800].
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Wordsworth. The lessons will help us design a system for hyperauthorship
less vulnerable to Wordsworthian malfeasance.
If poor Coleridge had issues with a single coauthor, how will we survive
with hundreds or even hundreds of thousands? That many more people
dramatically increases the likelihood of debilitating disagreement and the
involvement of people who may harm the project. Since we need a low
barrier of entry to permit hordes of authors, we can’t use a high barrier
of entry to prevent any Wordsworths from contributing. How, then, will
we protect the project’s integrity if almost anyone at all can contribute,
including many of whom we may not trust?
To grease the skids, we might elect some central authority to delegate
tasks and oversee their completion. But doing so would not secure the
project unequivocally. Trusting central authorities injects new risk factors
into the equation. Despite the advantages that central authorities often
bring, centralized power is centralized vulnerability. The link in a network
on which everything hangs is an attack vector vulnerable to both internal
and external forces. A central power may fall prey to jealousy, natural
disaster, theft, ignorance, laziness, bribery, nepotism, sexism, extended va-
cation, the spam folder, and assaults both digital and biological, among
other things.
Suppose we reject centralized governance models to avoid these risks.
Then how will thousands of coauthors coordinate eectively? Who decides
whether any particular sentence makes it into the story? By vote? Well, then
whose votes matter? A small body of special voters? If so, how would they
have been chosen in the first place? Or does everyone vote? And, either
way, which method would we use: plurality or majority rule, ranked-choice,
quadratic voting, or some other?25 On top of all this, how do we prevent
voting fraud? Overall, then, how can arbitrarily many authors agree on the
story’s content without a central authority, especially when authors lack
decisive reason to trust each other? We’ll call this the Coordination Problem.
The Coordination Problem concerns the creation of our story. But once
we’ve agreed on a chapter’s final form, how do we secure its continued in-
tegrity? Wordsworth has taught us that if anyone has enough power over the
project, even in a later edition, we risk surprise deletions, rearrangements,
and petty endnotes. Since, by stipulation, our hyperauthorship system will
continue its story indefinitely, one chapter at a time, our story will have
no later editions. Yet we still want previous chapters to sit more or less im-
mutably in their originally published state, even if someWordsworth among
us tries to tamper with them. And we want to protect the integrity of the
project not only from untrustworthy coauthors but also from incompetent
coauthors, hackers, and technological mishaps.
We don’t want Fat-finger Freddy or Harry the Hacker inserting typos
or deleting past chapters. We also don’t want Microsoft AutoUpdate or
a software bug in Dropbox to corrupt the file that encodes our story. To
complicate matters, if we don’t have any central authorities, we won’t rely
on any centralized service like Dropbox to store our ocial copy of the
story anyway. But, then, in what sense can we have an “ocial copy” at
25 For discusson of voting methods, see Pacuit [2019].
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all, if it doesn’t sit in a special place, like a queen on her throne? Here
we encounter our second problem: how can we preserve the integrity of
past chapters, and how can we make sense of the notion of integrity at all,
without relying on centralized authorities to store an ocial copy? We’ll
call this the Corruption Problem.
Finally, and with just a single coauthor, Coleridge did not get the credit
he deserved in the second edition. If the second edition had been the only
edition, Coleridge would have had some diculty later proving that he
was, in fact, the “friend” that had authored some of the poems. We hope
to assign credit properly for many thousands.26 And two further considera-
tions complicate matters. First, for a variety of reasons, authors sometimes
don’t want credit and prefer to operate anonymously or pseudonymously.
Second, sometimes authors don’t want credit initially but do later. Here
we have our third, and final, problem for hyperauthorship: how will we
attribute credit where it’s due even when thousands contribute, without
assigning unwanted credit, in a way that can be assigned reliably to any
contributor, even posthumously, and, again, without relying on central au-
thorities? We’ll call this the Credit Problem.
Building a system for hyperauthorship which eectively resolves the Co-
ordination, Corruption, and Credit problems is no small feat. But the com-
ponents which enable such a system appeared across various academic lit-
eratures by the 80s and 90s.27 We just need to bundle them together in the
right way and explain how the resulting bundle resolves those problems. I
do this in the next two sections.
4 Construction
In my model, coauthors write an on-going fictional story on a computer
network using a special protocol. A computer network (or “network” for
short) is a collection of computers linked to one another through commu-
nication channels. These channels allow computers on the network to ex-
change data. A network protocol is a system of rules encoded in software
for the exchange of data among network participants. Our model’s proto-
col governs a network of coauthors (writers), referees (those who ensure
written submissions pass muster), and publishers (those who disseminate
refereed submissions). The protocol ensures that submissions which meet
certain criteria get published, and those which violate any rule remain un-
published. As I will explain shortly, the network participants running the
protocol automate stages in publication typically entrusted to third parties
like Reviewer #2 and central authorities like Elsevier.
26 Attributing credit properly has posed a challenge for increasingly common hyper-
authored academic papers. See Ioannidis et al. [2018]. But I don’t mean to suggest
that there aren’t already eective solutions for assigning credit in cases of hyperauthor-
ship. For discussion of the notion of credit in Wikipedia, see Forte and Bruckman
[2005]. For discussion on the problems that arise in Wikipedia’s governance model,
see Kostakis [2010]. Importantly, Wikipedia’s governance model permits the kinds of
pockets of power that our system is designed to avoid.
27 Narayanan and Clark [2017].
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In replacing human referees and publishers with automated refereeing
and publishing, we haven’t simply exchanged one set of authorities for an-
other with the same vulnerabilities. The protocol distributes the work nor-
mally entrusted to authorities in a way that protects from abuse and attack.
So we spread our trust thinly over the whole network rather than let it pool
in a few large honeypots. The protocol will also remain open-source: any-
one can inspect its code to ensure that it doesn’t benefit some at the expense
of others. Hence, the method for thinly spreading our trust lies open for all
to inspect and verify.
4.1 Bread
Our protocol governs the creation of a simple story in breadworld, an imagi-
nary universe whose central character we will call bread. Bread is a fictional
substance whose smallest unit is a crumb. One hundred million crumbs
equals a loaf. A quantity of bread, as I use the term, is not just the mea-
surement for some mass of bread, but the very mass of bread to which
the measurement applies. The story also has a cast of baskets to give and
receive quantities of bread.
Breadworld obeys two main rules:
Conservation. No basket gives more or less bread than it has.
Exclusivity. Two baskets never hold the same particular quantity of
bread at once.28
The first rule implies that giving baskets empty their contents when they
give any bread at all. But they can give up to and including their full
amount right back to themselves. More importantly, Conservation en-
sures that baskets never give more than they themselves have received. So,
unlike some 1st century Palestinian baskets, baskets never increase the over-
all supply of bread when they give bread to others.
Now, Conservation does not imply Exclusivity. That basket’s can’t
give more than what they have received doesn’t mean that two baskets can’t
hold the very same quantity of bread at once. Similarly, the conservation of
mass and energy doesn’t prevent me from planting a single flag in dierent
territories. The territories just have to overlap. Exclusivity, in eect,
precludes baskets with “overlapping territories.”
4.2 Submissions
The story follows bread’s movements across a brigade of baskets. Every
sentence in the story specifies one or more baskets to empty, one or more
receiving baskets, and the amount each receives. But potential writers can-
not write sentences willy-nilly and dump bread from any baskets they like.
Each basket has a password without which one cannot write a publishable
sentence about emptying the basket’s contents. Each basket also has an
28 This is not to say that baskets may never hold the same measured amount of bread.
Two baskets may each have a loaf as long as they each have a dierent loaf.
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address to serve as its unique and permanent name. Baskets, then, strad-
dle the line between the real and the fictional: bread’s fictional movements
inside the story are anchored to password access outside the story.
Companies typically store their online users’ account information along
with their passwords. When you access an account to send an email, pay
a bill, or buy a product, the company checks to see whether the supplied
password matches the account’s stored password. This kind of system is
ripe for both internal abuse and external attack. First, companies can sell
or leak users’ personal information.29 Second, since accounts require com-
pany permission, companies can problematically withhold or cancel that
permission.30 Third, account databases lure hackers who can gain access
to millions of user accounts in one fell swoop.31 Users have good reason to
worry about privacy, censorship, and theft.
The breadworld network protects against these issues and doesn’t store
user passwords or any other personal data. So how can the network tell
whether or not a writer has the appropriate password for a candidate sen-
tence? The network uses two special garblers. Garblers garble: they take
a message or string of symbols as input, and return a seemingly random
string as output. They have two notable mathematical properties:
Consistency. No input ever gives dierent outputs.
Irreversibility. The best evidence suggests reverse-engineering
from output to input is practically impossible.
To give a feel for how random a garbler’s outputs appear, we’ve taken a
quartet of words that bear a family resemblance and fed them to a popular
garbler called SHA-256. Similar inputs give dissimilar outputs:
Figure 1. The SHA-256 garbler takes similar inputs and gives wildly dierent
outputs.
29 See Swire [1999] on financial privacy, in particular, and Solove [2004] on privacy more
generally.
30 See Aswad [2018] and Kesari et al. [2017] for recent discussion.
31 Cheng et al. [2017].
10
With one extra letter, or even with the same letters dierently arranged,
this garbler returns wildly dierent results. Yet one and the same string
of symbols always returns the same result. Despite this consistency, the
garblers remain immune from attempts to reverse-engineer them. You might
think that artificial intelligence could detect an emerging pattern in millions
of input-output pairs and with that pattern predict the input of an arbitrary
output. But the garblers within the breadworld protocol have withstood
these attacks. As a result, finding the input from such a garbler’s output
would require a brute-force search by feeding the garbler an unimaginably
large number of potential inputs until it generated the desired output. Even
with our best technology, unless we were unbelievably lucky, such a brute-
force search would take millions of years.
For many services, we choose a username or address and then generate
a password independently. But, for breadworld, we begin with the pass-
word, and the Password Garbler generates its address. Because the Password
Garbler is consistent, it never generates dierent addresses from a single
password. Even so, we cannot reverse-engineer the Password Garbler from
an address to its password. In summary, passwords generate addresses
through the Password Garbler, and addresses appear in the story as names
for baskets. But we cannot work backwards from an address in the story to
its password.
Every published sentence in our book includes three ingredients:
(i) The addresses of one or more giving baskets.32
(ii) The addresses of one or more receiving baskets.
(iii) The amount(s), held by the basket(s) in (i), to be given to the bas-
ket(s) in (ii).
Each publishable sentence also bears a digital signature for each of the
giving baskets. A digital signature provides proof that the writer has the
password for a giving basket. Here, we meet our next garbler, the Signer. To
produce a valid digital signature for a sentence, a writer privately feeds the
Signer not only (ii) and (iii) but also the passwords for the giving baskets
named in (i). In the simplest case of a single giving basket and a single re-
ceiving basket, the diagram below depicts the relation between a sentence’s
components (in the left column of yellow rectangles) and its signature:
32 Those who already understand the details of bitcoin transactions may balk at my
presentation here since I’ve chosen to use an account-based system rather than a
UTXO-based system, like bitcoin’s. But as Zahnentferner [2018] has argued, these
systems are intertranslatable. So I’ve chosen to include the simpler and more familiar
account-based system and will ease into bitcoin’s UTXO-based system in Section 7.
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Figure 2. How the Signer produces a digital signature.
The signature then joins the sentence to form a submission, much like we
see below:
Figure 3. A publishable submission with a valid signature.
Like the Password Garbler, the Signer is both consistent and irreversible.
It will return the same output from basket A’s password and a candidate
sentence every time. But we cannot use the candidate sentence and the
output to compute A’s password.
The Signer has one more feature, and it verges on the magical. The
connection between between a basket’s address and password enables a
public verification of the signature via the Notary. Why is this verification
so special? The Notary computes whether digital signatures have come
from the appropriate passwords without ever seeing them. All the Notary
needs is publicly available information: the sentence and the signature.33
The Password Garbler, the Signer, and the Notary together enable the
breadworld network to block sentences written from those who lack the
appropriate passwords without handling them. Since no central authority
stores user accounts, the bread in a user’s basket is as safe, in the story,
as the user’s password is secure, outside the story. Also, with no central
authority to grant or deny access, anyone can acquire a password-address
combo to submit a publishable sentence regardless of socioeconomic status,
race, religion, age, gender, and so on. With internet access and a free, open-
source breadworld writing app, one may generate a random password and
33 The mathematics involves public-key cryptography, which enables someone to use a
password to sign a message so that anyone, without the password, can verify whether
signature came from the password.
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its corresponding address for free. The basket corresponding to that pair
will appear in the story once the network publishes a submission which says
that the basket receives some bread.
In summary, each sentence includes the addresses of one or more giving
baskets, the addresses of one or more receiving baskets, and the amounts
of bread transferred. The sentence is publishable only if it comes with a
signature from the password of each giving basket. But how does a submis-
sion transition from publishable to published? Next, we examine the stages
leading to publication.
4.3 Referees
When someone submits a sentence to be published in the next chapter,
the network propagates the submission to the referees. Each referee is a
computer connected to the network running the breadworld protocol. The
software encodes, among other things, standards for publishable submis-
sions. Submissions that meet the standards are valid; otherwise, they are
invalid. A referee’s job is to judge whether submissions are valid or not.
Valid submissions meet two kinds of standards. First, they meet certain
syntactical standards. Valid submissions specify one or more giving bas-
kets, one or more receiving baskets, an amount of bread to give to each,
and the correct signature via the Signer, all in the proper order with the
appropriate symbols of the language. Second, valid submissions obey the
fundamental rules of the breadworld universe. On this front, referees re-
ject any submission that represents a basket as giving more bread than the
story most recently says it has. Referees judge submissions as they pour
in and forward valid submissions to the publisher’s queue where they await
publication.
4.4 Publishers
Like referees, publishers are computers on the network running the bread-
world protocol. Publishers compete every ten minutes to compile sentences
from the queue and publish them in the story’s next chapter. We’ll cover
what chapters are first and then how publishers compete to publish them
second.
Every chapter includes a title page along with a batch of submissions.
The title page includes both a summary of its submissions and a pointer to
the previous chapter. The summary is a garbled synopsis of the chapter’s
submissions from the Summarizer. And the pointer results from garbling
the previous chapter’s title page through the Sequencer. A chapter’s pointer
determines which chapter it should follow. Pointers therefore order chapters
from the most recent all the way back to the first, which is embedded like
stone in the breadworld software.
Publishers compete to solve a Sudoku puzzle to publish the next chapter.34
To solve a Sudoku, one finds a string of numerals that, from top-left to
34 I borrow the idea of using Sudoku puzzles as an explanatory strategy from Antonopou-
los [2017, 26-27].
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bottom-right, successfully fills in the Sudoku’s blanks. Here’s the catch.
The title page has a slot for a random number, and the solution to the
puzzle must come from the Puzzle Garbler after feeding it both a random
number (to fill that slot) and the title page of the candidate chapter:
Figure 4. The trial-and-error publishing puzzle.
Since the Puzzle Garbler garbles unpredictably, the only eective strategy
involves trying as many random numbers as quickly as possible until the
Puzzle Garbler spews out a solution. When that happens, the publisher fills
the slot in the title page with the winning random number.
Solutions are dicult to produce but easy to verify. A publisher who
solves a Sudoku then broadcasts the candidate chapter and solution for all
the referees to verify. Once verified, the referees add the winning publisher’s
version of the chapter to the end of their own individually stored version of
the story:
Figure 5. Two published chapters, in order.
Then the publishers begin to compete for the next chapter. If an oered so-
lution fails, publishers will continue to compete until a broadcasted solution
verifies.
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Publishers compete to have their version of the chapter published be-
cause the rules allow each publisher to insert a sentence within its candi-
date chapter about receiving a fixed amount of bread in a basket whose
password they have. So if a publisher’s version of the chapter appears in
the ocial story, so does a sentence which says that one of their baskets
receives bread out of thin air, like digital manna from heaven. Publishers
also have incentive to empty the queue. I’ve neglected to say that every
sentence represents the giving basket as giving a little bread to a basket of
the eventual puzzle-solving publisher. These are publication fees written
into the story itself.
To gain a competitive advantage, some publishers may use more pow-
erful processors to solve puzzles more quickly. But the network computes
the average solution time every two weeks and the puzzle diculty adjusts
automatically. When, on average, solutions come much more quickly than
ten minutes per puzzle, puzzle diculty increases. Then, publishers must
solve more dicult Sudokus for the next two weeks. Conversely, if aver-
age solution time increases substantially above ten minutes per puzzle, the
diculty decreases and publishers solve easier Sudokus for the next two
weeks.
The chapter ordering aorded by the Sequencer enables referees to
check whether the events described in a candidate chapter cohere with
previous chapters. Suppose I submit two sentences in quick succession,
one about emptying a basket of bread into your basket and a second about
emptying it into another one of my own baskets. The story would violate
Conservation if it included both. Since referees keep track of which bread
is in which baskets as they validate sentences, any referee which validates
one sentence will reject the other.
Yet two publishers might solve puzzles at around the same time and then
propagate competing chapters which disagree about whether my bread goes
to your basket or my own. If this happens, referees keep both versions of
the story going and eventually endorse the version with more accumulated
proof of work—proof of having used computing power to produce puzzle
solutions. The “proof” here resides in the solutions themselves. This is
usually the version with more chapters since each published chapter re-
quires its own puzzle solution. The referees then discard the version with
less proof of work. In this way, the network achieves consensus about the
story’s contents without central authorities.
Because the network may take some time to reach consensus, the bread-
world protocol also rejects sentences about sending bread won in any puz-
zle from the previous one hundred chapters. This prevents publishers from
reaping rewards for orphaned chapters. However, the network doesn’t com-
pletely orphan candidate chapters excluded for lack of proof of work. Pre-
viously validated sentences in failed chapters which remain consistent with
the ocial storyline return to the publisher’s queue for inclusion in the next
chapter. The growing chain of agreed upon chapters stored individually by
each referee constitutes the ever-expanding book of breadworld.
That’s the system. To review, a network of computers running free,
open-source software automates and decentralizes the refereeing and publi-
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cation processes. Instead of trusting Referee #2, Quirky Editor, or Elsevier
to behave responsibly, the network uses a transparent set of rules to vali-
date individual submissions and forge consensus about the ocial storyline.
With our model now complete, we may proceed to the next stage of mod-
eling.
5 Analysis
According to Weisberg [2007, 209, 222-224], model analysis involves study-
ing the model independently of its relation to the target phenomenon. Our
analysis here comes in two parts. We will first evaluate how the bread-
world network resolves the Coordination, Corruption, and Credit problems.
Then, we will examine the ontology of breadworld.
5.1 The Coordination Problem
As you might recall from Section 2, the Coordination Problem concerns
the eective coordination of arbitrarily many authors without a central au-
thority. Breadworld authors can coordinate eectively because the stages
leading to publication use an open-source protocol with simple rules about
the form and content of written submissions on a decentralized and per-
missionless network.
First, because the protocol is open-source, authors have access to the
rules governing every stage leading to publication and can judge the proto-
col’s fairness. The protocol’s simplicity enables authors to learn these rules
relatively easily and submit sentences for publication accordingly.
Second, breadworld’s network automates and distributes jobs we would
otherwise reserve for humans in powerful positions. Automated referees
verify submissions, and automated publishers compete to publish them. By
automating these jobs, we greatly mitigate the vulnerabilities typically asso-
ciated with human weakness. And by distributing jobs so that the network
lacks a central clearinghouse, we greatly mitigate the risk of abuse or attack.
Third, the network is permissionless and so requires neither registra-
tion with nor permission from anyone to contribute. Hence, anyone with
internet access can join as a coauthor or devote resources for refereeing
and publishing. And yet the involvement of so many does not increase the
likelihood that the project will fail. The protocol fairly adjudicates disagree-
ment with its consensus mechanism and protects the project’s integrity by
rejecting submissions and candidate chapters which violate the protocol’s
rules.
5.2 The Corruption Problem
Whereas the Coordination Problem concerns the project’s synchronic in-
tegrity, the Corruption Problem concerns its diachronic integrity. How
does the network preserve the integrity of past chapters without using a
central authority to store an ocial copy? Let’s examine what happens
when someone tries to alter a previously published chapter. Suppose we’ve
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just published Chapter 10, and Harry the Hacker tries to alter Chapter 4
by editing, deleting, or adding a sentence. He can’t do it by hacking into a
central database because there is none. Each referee stores its own copy of
the ocial story.
Yet hacking into one or even a few of these copies to change Chapter 4
won’t work either. As you might recall from our discussion in the previous
section, chapters are ordered linearly by their pointers. A chapter’s pointer
abbreviates data from the previous chapter, including the summary of all
the previous chapter’s breadworld sentences. So Harry’s altered Chapter 4
will have a dierent summary, and, as a result, fail to provide the pointer
already published as part of the version of Chapter 5 stored by all the
other referees. Consequently, the network will reject Harry’s Chapter 4 as
the chapter prior to Chapter 5 and instead treat Harry’s Chapter 4 as the
beginning of an alternative storyline which, if it continues, will require an
alternative Chapter 5, 6, 7, and so on.
By the protocol’s rules, each referee “votes” for the version of the story
with the most accumulated proof of work, the proof of having devoted com-
puting power to solve puzzles. Harry’s alternate storyline with fewer chap-
ters has much less accumulated proof of work. So if Harry wants the net-
work referees to endorse his version of Chapter 4, he will need to continue
the alternate storyline until it has more accumulated proof of work than the
original version, even as the original version continues to grow. This could
require Harry to devote an enormous amount of energy because he would
need to solve Sudokus on his own and at a faster clip than the rest of the
network combined.
Harry’s case illustrates that tampering with any past chapter requires
re-writing and re-publishing all subsequent chapters. As long as enough
publishers compete on the network, the computational power required to
publish becomes cost prohibitive and makes chapters further back prac-
tically immutable. Thus, more recent chapters serve as digital sediment
or amber whose gradual accumulation provides an increasingly protective
layer for past chapters.
However, the book of breadworld is not completely secure. For instance,
even if the network uses an enormous amount of energy, a malicious state-
level actor could conceivably marshal enough energy to mount a successful
attack. A dierent network with a dierent story could also draw publishers
away from breadworld’s own network and drastically weaken it, as a result.
Finally, the breadworld network largely relies on the internet. Hence, the
network inherits the internet’s own vulnerabilities to cable-cutting, nuclear
weapons, and electromagnetic pulse devices. So although the breadworld
network eectively mitigates some vulnerabilities, it isn’t completely with-
out its own.
5.3 The Credit Problem
To resolve the Credit Problem, the network must attribute credit where it’s
due, without assigning credit where it’s unwanted, in a way that can be
assigned posthumously—all without relying on a central authority. Is this
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possible?
Well, only someone with a basket’s password can write a publishable
sentence about giving bread from it. And that password generates a sin-
gle address which serves as the basket’s unique name. As a result, we can
treat the address of a sentence’s giving basket as a pseudonym for the sen-
tence’s author. Hence, each sentence with multiple giving baskets includes
a pseudonym for each coauthor. No sentence goes uncredited, and no one’s
pseudonym gets credit it doesn’t deserve.
Those authors who also want their credit transmitted to their public
identities can prove at any time that they have the password associated
with the pseudonymous address. To establish proof of authorship without
giving away the password, an author can use the Signer (from Section 4.2)
to sign an arbitrary message with the password. Then, with the message
and the signature, anyone can use the Notary to verify whether the resulting
signature arose from the correct password.
Authors also have some control when the verification happens, if ever.
An author who wants credit for submissions under a certain pseudonym can
sign an arbitrary message and post the message and the signature in a pub-
lic place. Or if an author wants credit later, she can post that information
later. But this can also be done within the story itself. I’ve not yet men-
tioned that each sentence has a tiny “memo” field in which one may write
a small message. And this might be useful not only in cases in which one
wants to prove who one is but also in cases in which one wants to prove
who one is not, especially when someone publicly claims to be behind a
pseudonym that, in fact, belongs to you. The network also allows someone
to schedule a sentence far into the future. So someone may combine the
schedulng and memo features to reveal an identity posthumously.
In summary, the breadworld network eectively solves the Coordination,
Corruption, and Credit Problems. The system does have limitations, how-
ever. First, although the simplicity of the protocol allows many thousands
of authors to coordinate, that same simplicity severely limits the story’s arc.
Second, although the proof of work system may prevent Harry the Hacker
from tampering, the network may not withstand global catastrophe, attack
from a state-level actor, or just a large-scale loss of interest. Third, the
Password Garbler’s irreversibility renders lost passwords practically unre-
coverable. So users must hide passwords well enough but not so well that
they lock themselves out forever.
5.4 Ontology
My model involves the creation of a massively coauthored story in which
breadworld bread appears as the main character. Breadworld bread is a
fictional substance, but recognizing it as such doesn’t mire us in philosoph-
ical controversies surrounding fictional entities. Since fictional entities are
so deeply controversial, though, I want to clarify what I do and don’t mean
when I say that breadworld bread is a fictional substance.
I don’t mean to imply that breadworld bread is a fictional substance right
now, on the same footing as Sherlock Holmes or Oliver Twist. Sherlock and
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Oliver appear in actual fictional stories. Not so with breadworld bread. The
book of breadworld has never been written and only appears in a model as
the product of an imagined network. However, if we brought my model into
reality and began writing the breadworld story, its main character would
be a fictional substance.35 When I say that breadworld bread is a fictional
substance, I mean that breadworld bread is a fictional substance in the model.
Philosophers dispute both whether fictional entities exist or have being
in some attenuated sense, and, if they do, what kinds of things they are. Fol-
lowing Kroon and Voltolini [2018] and the two-part division in Thomasson
[1999], I’ll call these the ontological and the metaphysical questions, respec-
tively. To illustrate, I might answer the ontological question armatively
and then answer the metaphysical question by identifying fictional entities
like Sherlock Holmes with a certain kind of abstract object. In addition to
these two questions, some philosophers also dispute whether certain things
appearing in literary works qualify as fictional in the first place. I’ll call this
the classicatory question, and it is importantly dierent from the first two.
For example, historical persons and places sometimes arguably appear in
works of fiction, and some dispute whether the persons and places are the
actual historical persons and places or merely fictional analogues of them.36
Yet few, if any, philosophers dispute whether Sherlock Holmes is fic-
tional.37 Sherlock is a prototypical fictional character in the minds of many.
Even so, theorists may disagree on whether Sherlock, as a fictional charac-
ter, has being or existence in some sense. Even though we refer to fictional
characters and say true things about them, some theorists deny that Sher-
lock and other fictional characters exist or have any sort of being. These
theorists’ answer to the classificatory question sets ‘em up (“These are the
fictions”), and then their answer to the ontological question knocks ‘em
down (“Fictional entities don’t exist”).38 That is, once we specify the do-
35 There’s an important dierence between being a fictional entity and being a work of
fiction. I claim that, in the model, bread is a fictional substance represented by a work
of fiction. But since, outside my model, the digital book of breadworld corresponds
to no real-world entity, some might also identify the book as a fictional entity, albeit a
fictional entity that is itself a work of fiction. On the relation between modeled entities
and fiction, see Godfrey-Smith [2006a] and Weisberg [2013, Ch. 4]. I take no stance in
this debate. Some also endorse the argument in Kripke [1980, 24, 156–58] that fictional
characters cannot be brought to life, as it were, no matter how closely some real-world
entity corresponds to a character’s profile in the fiction. I’m also neutral on this point.
So I also don’t mean to imply that if we made my model reality and began to coauthor
a book about bread in the ways I’ve specified, then the resulting book would be the
book of breadworld from the model. Nor do I mean to imply that the resulting book’s
main character would be the main character from the book described in the model.
So, yes, there are philosophical controversies surrounding fictional entities and their
connections to models, but my main claims here survive within a quite broad range
of resolutions to those debates.
36 Following Terence Parsons [1980, 57-59], we may frame the debate as being about
whether the object appearing in the fiction is an immigrant from the real world or
a surrogate for the corresponding real-world entity. See Motoarca [2014] for a recent
examination of issues surrounding the debate.
37 Some intellectuals play the so-called Sherlockian game and treat Sherlock and Watson
as subjects of historical interest. For a founding text of this practice, see Knox [1920].
38 See Kroon and Voltolini [2018, Sec. 2] for references and discussion.
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main of fiction, we may then argue that the whole lot does or doesn’t exist.
We may also identify something as a fictional character but remain neutral
about the more controversial ontological and metaphysical questions. Such
is my stance here. When I say that, in the model, breadworld bread is a fic-
tional substance, I simply mean to put it in the same category as Sherlock,
whatever he is. I’m merely classifying, and I’m not making a controversial
claim about the ontology or metaphysics of fictional entities.
We have good reason to classify breadworld bread and Sherlock simi-
larly. Nothing external to the Conan Doyle stories has the properties that
those stories ascribe to Sherlock. And nothing external to the breadworld
story has the properties that the book of breadworld ascribes to bread.
Breadworld loaves neatly divide into 100 million crumbs. Breadworld bread
is tasteless and odorless, and has been passed across many digitally repre-
sented baskets in highly specific quantities in a certain order. We can’t say
the same of anything outside the book of breadworld. I don’t mean to sug-
gest that something couldn’t be a fictional entity if something beyond the
story in which it appears has the properties the story ascribes to it.39 I’m
merely suggesting that the reasons why most treat Sherlock as a fictional
character apply equally well to breadworld bread.
Now, are there any reasons not to classify breadworld bread as a fictional
substance? Could we plausibly argue that bread isn’t a fictional substance
because the breadworld coauthors aren’t writing a story? I don’t see how.
Published breadworld sentences concern the movements of a quantifiable
substance that doesn’t exist outside the story and in a universe that operates
in accordance with a few well-defined rules. The coauthors aren’t lying, and
they, too, understand that bread has no correlate in the world external to the
story. The story may look boring to outsiders, but boring stories are stories,
nonetheless. Besides, the initiated may enjoy the story’s many interwoven
subplots and exciting twists. Imagine the flurry of activity in the online
breadworld message boards when a long-dormant basket holding the largest
ever quantity of bread gives some to another basket without warning.40 I’ve
read many less exciting fictional stories, and any attempt to include them
as works of fiction while excluding the breadworld story would likely have
some implausible consequences.
Might we deny that bread is a fictional substance because the book of
39 Kripke [2011, 59].
40 Breadworld could plausibly achieve this level and intensity of participation, especially
if amounts of bread were valued like a commodity, which is also plausible, given the
development of a circular economy and a price floor initially set by the publishers.
Questions about participation on such a scale raise the issue of social scalability, a
notion defined in Szabo [2017]. Szabo writes:
Social scalability is the ability of an institution—a relationship or shared
endeavor, in which multiple people repeatedly participate, and featuring
customs, rules, or other features which constrain or motivate partici-
pants’ behaviors—to overcome shortcomings in human minds and in
the motivating or constraining aspects of said institution that limit who
or how many can successfully participate.
20
breadworld is still being written? Many hold that authors help create fic-
tions.41 If a fiction doesn’t come to be until the creative process ceases or
the story concludes, wouldn’t breadworld bread fail to qualify as a fiction
since the creative process continues indefinitely? Even if this were true,
breadworld bread would at least be a merely intentional object in the unob-
jectionable sense: someone represents it in thought and nothing beyond the
representation has the properties so represented.42 It would also be in good
company. For such a view arguably implies the same about, say, a slew of
characters in the novels that Dickens published in serial form. Would we
really want to deny that Mr. Grimwig was a fictional character until Dickens
published Oliver Twist in its entirety, even though he appeared in monthly
installments of Bentley’s Miscellany up until that point? If not, we would have
little reason to deny that breadworld bread is a fictional substance through
the first installments of the breadworld story.
Whether fictional entities exist, or what they are if they do, is neither
here nor there. If fictional entities exist, breadworld bread, as one of them,
would exist. If fictional entities don’t exist, breadworld bread, as one of
them, wouldn’t exist. No matter how we settle the more controversial de-
bates about fiction, if we jumpstarted a breadworld network today, the main
character in its digital book would be a fictional substance by any reason-
able measure.
6 Assessment
Having completed the first two stages of modeling, we now begin the third
stage—assessment. Here, we coordinate aspects of our model with aspects
of the bitcoin network to assess whether the model is suciently similar to it.
This coordination occurs according to what Weisberg [2007, 219-221] calls
the construal, a description of what the modeler does and doesn’t intend
to model in the target phenomenon alongside the criteria for evaluating
whether the model represents the target as intended.43 I’ll begin with a
quick primer on bitcoin. As I go, I’ll note some important dierences with
the model. Then I’ll map aspects of the model onto the bitcoin network
and argue that the more interesting things we’ve said about the model apply
equally well to the bitcoin network.
6.1 The Bitcoin Network
On Halloween 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto posted a whitepaper online about
how a peer-to-peer network could automate and distribute jobs normally
entrusted to third parties like banks and credit card companies. He jump-
started the network within months. And, several years later, it continues
to facilitate transactions of its native digital asset and record those trans-
41 Braun [2005], Goodman [2004], Kripke [2011], Salmon [2002], Searle [1975], Schier
[1996, 2003], Voltolini [2006, 2015], Thomasson [1999], van Inwagen [1977].
42 Compare Thomasson [1999, 89].
43 Compare Godfrey-Smith [2006a, 733].
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actions in a fully public ledger.44 In what follows, I will examine how the
bitcoin network both facilitates and records transactions.
6.1.1 Bitcoin
Unfortunately, ‘bitcoin’ is at least four-ways ambiguous in present usage. It
can be used as a mass noun for a kind of stu (“he has bitcoin”), a unit of
measurement for that stu (“his has 2.3 bitcoin”), a count noun (“he has
two bitcoins”), and a name for the entire network, which is then sometimes
capitalized. The smallest unit of bitcoin (in the mass noun sense) is a
satoshi, in honor of bitcoin’s pseudonymous inventor. 100 million satoshis
equal a single bitcoin (in the count noun sense). I will usually use ‘bitcoin’
in the mass noun sense, and ‘the bitcoin network’ to refer to the network
overall. Otherwise, the context should indicate whether I’ve used ‘bitcoin’
as a count noun or as a unit of measurement.
6.1.2 Transactions
The protocol governs the movements of amounts of bitcoin across addresses
much like the breadworld protocol governs the movements of bread in its
story across basket addresses. Each bitcoin address has both a private key
and a public key. These keys work together in a cryptographic system called
public-key cryptography that enables both message encryption and message
authentication.45 I can encrypt a message with your public key. But even
if everyone knows your public key, if you alone have its private key, only
you can decrypt the message. Separately, I can also use my own private key
on a message to produce a digital signature so that anyone with only the
message, signature, and my public key can verify whether I used the public
key’s paired private key to produce that signature. Bitcoin uses public-
key cryptography for both message encryption and authentication but in a
slightly more complicated way.
Bitcoin adds addresses to the usual mix of public-key cryptography’s
private and public keys. Here’s how. Each private key generates a public key
through what mathematicians call a one-way function. Since the function
is one-way, we cannot practically run it in reverse to find a public key’s
paired private key. And since it is a mathematical function, the private
key always generates the same public key. One-way functions are consistent
and irreversible—they’re garblers, in other words. The particular one-way
function that uses the private key to generate its public key is elliptic curve
multiplication (hereafter, ECM ).46
The public key then generates an address through another one-way func-
tion called a hash function. The particular hash function that uses the public
key to generate an address is actually a compound hash function, a function
that garbles the public key and then takes the result and garbles it again.
More specifically, the first function, SHA-256, garbles the public key, and
44 Nakamoto [2008].
45 For early overviews by two pioneers in cryptography, see Hellman [1978] and Die
[1988].
46 See Song [2019, Chapters 1-3] for an introduction to the use of elliptic curves in bitcoin.
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then the second, RIPEMD160, garbles the result.47 The diagram below
captures the path of a private key to its address through a series of one-way
functions:
Figure 6. From a private key to an address.
(For those with a technical background, let’s pause here to address a philo-
sophical issue about bitcoin addresses and their relation to the basket ad-
dresses in my model.48 The “address” that emerges from RIPEMD160 ap-
pears in the blockchain in hexadecimal format. But we typically don’t en-
counter addresses in hexadecimal. Addresses, as we typically encounter
them, have been translated into the more concise and human-readable
Base58 format. So if you look for your Base58-encoded bitcoin address
within your raw transaction data in the blockchain, you won’t find it. Re-
flecting on this observation, Andreas Antonopoulos [2017, 118-119] writes:
Behind the scenes, an actual transaction looks very dierent
from a transaction provided by a typical block explorer. In fact,
most of the high-level constructs we see in the various bitcoin
application user interfaces do not actually exist in the bitcoin
system. ... In bitcoin, there are ... no addresses. [Among other
things, addresses] are constructed at a higher level for the ben-
efit of the user, to make things easier to understand.
If an address is just the Base58 string of characters, then Antonopoulos is
right—addresses don’t appear in the blockchain. But that’s not the whole
story. First, the hexidecimal strings that generate Base58 addresses appear
in the blockchain’s transaction outputs, the parts of transactions that spec-
ify which amount of bitcoin goes where. To spend the bitcoin from an
output, one must have the private key that hashes into the output’s hex-
adecimal string. So one could make the case that the hexadecimal strings
serve as addresses, fundamentally speaking, and that the Base58 strings are
merely addresses in a derivative sense. We use the Base58 strings outside
the bitcoin blockchain to abbreviate the hexadecimal strings that actually
function as addresses within the blockchain.
Second, both Base58 addresses and their hexadecimal counterparts name
the very same mathematical object. Just as we have dierent names for the
47 One can understand the notion of an address as either the hash of a public key (or
a script hash, given P2SH, “pay-to-script-hash”) or, more broadly, as the recipient in
any transaction. In this latter sense, public keys once served frequently as addresses
in the transaction format known as P2PK (“pay-to-public-key”). But even in Bitcoin
0.1.0, the software’s first release, users could send bitcoin to the hashes of public keys
in the transaction format known as P2PKH (“pay-to-public-key-hash). P2PKH gained
prominence due to the extra layers of security provided by SHA-256 and RIPEMD160.
48 Thanks to Matthew McKeever for raising this issue.
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number 31 whether we write in decimal (‘31’), hexadecimal (‘1F’), binary
(‘1111’), or Base58 (‘Y’), the number that goes by a certain Base58 bitcoin
address appears by another name in hexadecimal within the blockchain’s
transaction outputs. Why is this important? Well, addresses serve as names
for locations. Whereas both street addresses and coordinates name loca-
tions in physical space, Base58 addresses and their hexidecimal counter-
parts name abstract locations in mathematical space—numbers. A bitcoin
transaction output isn’t just code; each output says something with a mean-
ing endowed by the practices and intentions of the bitcoin community. And
what a bitcoin transaction output says is that some number of satoshis is
tied to a number, a location in mathematical space.49 The fictional bas-
kets, in my model, correspond to these abstract locations in mathematical
space. And the addresses of breadworld baskets correspond to the hexadec-
imal addresses appearing in bitcoin transaction outputs. So, by design, the
breadworld model does not have something that corresponds to bitcoin’s
Base58 addresses. This is one way in which the model simplifies for the
benefit of understanding.)
Now, suppose I have some bitcoin. How do I update the ledger to show
that you receive some of it? Using one of many free, open-source appli-
cations, I must first compose a transaction.50 Valid transactions have two
parts: inputs and outputs. Each output locks an amount of bitcoin to an
address and thus has two smaller parts:
(i) a recipient address
(ii) an amount to send to the recipient.
In the blockchain, each output has a unique identifier.51
A transaction output then remains unspent (during which time we call
it a UTXO) until the network publishes another transaction with an input
that unlocks its bitcoin. To unlock a UTXO, an input must contain:
(iii) an identifier for the UTXO in which the present spender’s address
appears as recipient,
(iv) the public key that generates the address in (iii), and
(v) a digital signature over the data in (i)-(iii), from the private key for
the address in (iii).
Overall, then, transaction inputs unlock bitcoin previously sent to an ad-
dress, and outputs lock bitcoin with a specification of how much of it should
go where.
49 Interestingly, the number written in hexadecimal and usually translated into Base58 is
the result of hashing a public key, which is itself a number constructed from the x and
y coordinates of a point on an elliptic curve. So bitcoin addresses name locations in
mathematical space that themselves ultimately correspond to locations in geometric
space.
50 For a fuller account of transactions, see Warmke (ms).
51 The identifier comes in two parts: an identifier for the transaction, and then a number
for the output within that transaction.
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So, again, how do I update the ledger to show that I’ve sent you bit-
coin? Thankfully, wallet applications simplify the details for us. But, under
the hood, the application composes a chunk of code that contains, first,
a new output with your address and the appropriate amount, and second,
an input that references a UTXO along with the information that unlocks
that UTXO. The information that unlocks the UTXO includes my public
key,52 which hashes to the recipient address embedded in the UTXO, and
a valid digital signature. The digital signature itself results after (privately)
feeding a digital signature algorithm both the private key and other cru-
cial information from the new transaction (excluding my public key and,
of course, the signature itself). At the time I write, bitcoin uses the elliptic
curve digital signature algorithm, or ECDSA.53 The diagram below shows
the interrelations among my transaction’s components:
Figure 7. The anatomy of a bitcoin transaction.
No one sees the private key, but due to the aforementioned relation be-
tween it and its address, anyone can verify whether the appropriate private
key helped produce the digital signature over this particular transaction.
This feature will come in handy soon. The software application then con-
catenates all these pieces together and sends the result to the network.
Before we see what happens to my submitted transaction, we should
undo a terminological knot and then note a dierence with the breadworld
network. First, the knot. Transactions are often described as including sig-
natures. But signatures are also often described as being signed over the
transaction. These two descriptions don’t harmonize. Just as no person is
his own parent, no signature results from being one of its own inputs into
the signature algorithm. To avoid confusion, it is helpful to remember the
distinction between breadworld submissions and breadworld transactions.
Breadworld submissions compare with bitcoin transactions. Both include
signatures. Breadworld sentences then correspond to trimmed bitcoin trans-
actions: transactions minus signatures.54
52 So, in an important sense, bitcoin transactions do not involve “from addresses.” See
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/From_address.
53 A recent Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (or, “BIP”) for Schnorr signa-
tures stands a good chance of being adopted in the near future. See
https://github.com/sipa/bips/blob/bip-schnorr/bip-schnorr.mediawiki.
54 For more details, see Rosenbaum [2019, 127-138].
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Finally, we should note that bitcoin transactions dier in an important
way from breadworld sentences. Whereas bitcoin transactions generally
reference one or more past transactions, breadworld sentences do not ref-
erence past sentences. Why not? The breadworld network fundamentally
tracks the balances of addresses. With every new published sentence, the
network debits an amount of bread from the sending address and cred-
its that same amount to the receiving address. Our bank accounts in real
life use this method. Both the breadworld story and our bank balances are
account-based. But the bitcoin network does not fundamentally track fluctu-
ating account balances. It tracks transaction outputs which remain unspent.
So bitcoin transactions are not account-based but UTXO-based. Imagine
if we never deposited checks but instead tracked them as we signed them
over from person-to-person. We could record the overall value of checks
each owns, but these balances would derive from the checks themselves.
Similarly, the “balance” of a bitcoin address seen in a bitcoin wallet derives
from the UTXOs in which that address has been the recipient. Since UTXO-
based systems are less familiar, I chose to use a more familiar account-based
system in the model for accessibility. As long as we note the simplification
on the back end, the model still works as intended.55
Now, if you recall, I had submitted a transaction to the network to ap-
pear in the ledger. What happens next?
6.1.3 Full Nodes
My submitted transaction then awaits verification by the network’s full
nodes. Full nodes are computers connected to the network running free,
open-source bitcoin software. They use the software to check whether sub-
mitted transactions follow the protocol’s rules.56 These rules concern the
proper syntax for transactions and also rules similar to those governing
breadworld’s fictional universe. Full nodes reject transactions with improper
syntax and attempts to spend already spent bitcoin. They also reject trans-
actions without valid digital signatures and any transaction that attempts
to spend more bitcoin than the UTXOs it tries to unlock.
The full nodes validate my transaction, and let me unlock bitcoin in
a UTXO, only if the transaction contains (i) the public key that generates
the UTXO’s recipient address, and (ii) a valid digital signature on the new,
trimmed down transaction. Without access to the private key, full nodes
use the signature verification function to verify whether the signature came
from the private key. Valid transactions survive these and other checks
unscathed. Full nodes then forward them to a queue called the mempool to
await bundling and eventual inclusion in the ledger’s next block, a verified
bundle of valid transactions.
55 Zahnentferner [2018] shows that account-based and UTXO-based ledgers are actually
intertranslatable. For a deeper explanation of the distinction, see Akcora et al. [2018,
2-3].
56 The software is available at https://bitcoin.org/en/bitcoin-core/.
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6.1.4 Miners
Bitcoin miners compete to have their bundled version of transactions from
the mempool appear as the next block in the ledger. I’ll explain what blocks
are and how miners compete to produce them in turn.
Like breadworld chapters, each bitcoin block includes a summary of
its contents and, with an exception for the first block, a pointer to its
immediate predecessor. These appear in the block header. Here, a sum-
mary of the block’s transactions exists in the form of a cryptographic di-
gest called a Merkle tree root.57 The root, which is just 64 hexadecimal
characters, results from garbling pairs of transactions, then garbling pairs
of garblings, and so on, until a lone garbling remains. The garbling here
is done each time via double-SHA-256, a compound function that garbles
an input through SHA-256 and then re-garbles the result through SHA-256.
We’ll see double-SHA-256 again shortly.
The block header also feeds into a hash function whose output is a
digital fingerprint for it called a hash pointer. The function here, again,
is double-SHA-256. The resulting hash pointer of each block then appears
in the subsequent block’s header. When full nodes receive a candidate
block, its hash pointer determines which block it immediately follows. Hash
pointers therefore order chapters linearly from the most recent all the way
back to the first, which is embedded like stone in the bitcoin software.
Miners compete by trying to solve a mathematical puzzle. Solving the
puzzle requires finding a number (a “nonce”) which, when appended to
the rest of the candidate block’s header and fed to our good friend, double-
SHA-256, gives a number beginning with so many repeating zeroes. (So the
puzzle solution for a block neatly serves as its hash pointer in the subsequent
block. Hence, in breadworld speak, the Puzzle Garbler is the Sequencer.)
Because the function is one-way, solving the puzzle requires trying as many
nonces as possible until the equation spits out a value beginning with at
least the necessary number of zeroes. The puzzle is like an algebra problem
where several solutions exist for x, but solving for x requires trial and error
from an unimaginably large pool of numbers.
A miner who finds a lucky nonce then sends it and the candidate chapter
back to the full nodes to verify the puzzle’s solution. The nodes then verify
that the block follows the protocol’s rules before endorsing it as the most
recent in a growing series of verified blocks. Each verified block appears
in the full nodes’ mutually agreed-upon but individually stored version of
the ledger. The growing series of verified blocks secured by the network
constitutes bitcoin’s blockchain, a fully public but distributed ledger.58
Miners compete to solve puzzles because each block in the ledger in-
cludes a coinbase transaction providing bitcoin to the winning miner out of
thin air. All bitcoin that ever exists will have come from such an award.59
57 For accessible explanations of the cryptographic tools in this section, see Narayanan
et al. [2016].
58 You may browse the ledger at https://blockstream.info/.
59 Satoshi mined the first block, and it is embedded in the bitcoin software. This aptly
named “genesis block” contains a hidden message: “The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancel-
lor on brink of second bailout for banks,” which references a newspaper article from
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Every four years, a “halving” occurs, and the amount of bitcoin awarded
halves. By 2140, these rewards will cease, and the number of bitcoins in ex-
istence will remain permanently at just under 21 million. Bitcoin’s provable
scarcity has inspired many to treat it as a commodity whose potential value
swamps the costs of running more powerful processors to gain a competi-
tive advantage over other miners. But the bitcoin network assimilates more
computing power without departing from its issuance schedule.
Every two weeks, the network computes the average puzzle solution
time. If miners solve puzzles on average much more quickly (or slowly) than
ten minutes, puzzle diculty automatically increases (decreases). When
puzzle diculty increases, miners must find a nonce such that the input
of it and the transaction bundle in the one-way function gives a number
beginning with some computed number of extra zeroes. This restricts the
pool of potentially lucky nonces, decreases the probability that any given
nonce will solve the puzzle, and therefore increases the average solution
time. Conversely, if average solution time increases substantially above
ten minutes over two weeks, puzzle diculty decreases to a target number
beginning with some computed number of fewer zeroes. This increases the
pool of potentially lucky nonces, increases the probability that any given
nonce will solve the puzzle, and thereby decreases average solution time.
But, on the whole, puzzle diculty has steadily increased. The network’s
incentive structure draws miners in to compete in an arms race which, as
we’ll see, strengthens the network’s own security.
Merkle tree roots and hash pointers together help the bitcoin network
track unspent bitcoin. With a summary of transactions for each block and
an order of blocks, the network can reject attempts to spend bitcoin that
it judges to have been already spent. Yet these cryptographic tools alone
cannot resolve the situation in which dierent miners solve a puzzle around
the same time and propagate competing blocks. Like the referees of bread-
world, full nodes keep both versions of the chain going but eventually en-
dorse the version with more accumulated proof of work. So the further
back in the chain a transaction appears, the more secure it is against an
attempted double-spend.
Double-spending bitcoin would require altering the historical record by
re-mining blocks in the ledger so that it says the bitcoin has not been spent.
This kind of attack on the ledger would require an enormous amount of
energy because the attacker must solve cryptographic puzzles at a faster
clip than the rest of the network combined. This is cost prohibitive and
makes blocks further back practically immutable as long as plenty of nodes
and miners continue to operate on the network.
Satoshi designed bitcoin’s consensus mechanism to steer through the
Byzantine generals problem, a problem about reaching consensus among
actors to avoid catastrophic failure when some of those actors are unre-
liable.60 Bitcoin’s distributed consensus concerns which addresses hold
the fallout of the 2008 financial crisis. The reference shows that the chapter wasn’t
written before 2009, which ensures that, unless Satoshi time-travelled, he has no secret
stash of bitcoin created before 2009.
60 An early statement of this problem appears in Pease et al. [1980] under an-
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which amounts of bitcoin, and its proof of work system eectively prevents
attempts to spend the same bitcoin twice without relying on central author-
ities. So bitcoin solves the Byzantine generals problem and the so-called
double spending problem for digital cash in one fell swoop.61 Satoshi eec-
tively solved both problems by drawing miners into an arms race with the
promise of value that the arms race itself secures.
Though the bitcoin network mitigates vulnerabilities associated with in-
termediaries and central authorities, it isn’t bulletproof. Someone could
conceivably crack the algorithm that generates public keys from private
keys to gain access to any unspent bitcoin. An inflation bug could appear
in a new version of the software.62 Someone might open up a large short
position to cover the cost of attacking the network. Central banks and
politicians might even put together a record of responsible monetary and
fiscal policy. And, of course, doomsday scenarios which would cripple the
internet would severely weaken bitcoin, too. Although these scenarios seem
unlikely, they are possible, nonetheless.63
6.2 Bread meets Bitcoin
Before we delve into more detailed comparisons between bread and bit-
coin, let’s look at a bigger picture question about whether a story, a literary
creation, is apt for modeling the bitcoin blockchain, a ledger specifically
made for transferring value. First, as I noted in Sections 1 and 2, we can
successfully model without modeling every feature of a target phenomenon.
In fact, models are meant to simplify, so if they modeled every feature of
a target phenomenon, they would lose their eectiveness as models. The
breadworld model is primarily meant to show both what bitcoin is, meta-
physically, and, how the network functions. I will explain those aspects of
the model soon. On top of these aspects, bitcoin also has various economic
properties having to do with its being a store of value and medium of ex-
change. Does the absence of these features in the breadworld model count
against it?
Not in my view. As long as the modeling successfully leads us to the
various metaphysical and functional conclusions I draw below, the model
other name, and the coauthors themselves had some diculty reaching consen-
sus. In a reflective abstract of the paper (available at https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/research/publication/reaching-agreement-presence-faults/) coauthor Leslie Lamport
recounts that he “wrote an initial draft, which displeased Shostak so much that
[Shostak] completely rewrote it to produce the final version.” The authors settled
on the problem’s name and popular description in Lamport et al. [1982], after realiz-
ing that a paper entitled “The Albanian Generals Problem” might cause oense. See
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/byzantine-generals-problem/.
61 Recently, Eric Budish [2018, 6] has called the “double” part of the problem’s name a
“misnomer” since “the attacker can re-spend his Bitcoins arbitrarily many times.” The
problem is so named precisely because solving it prevents any 2 + n spending (where
n is any positive integer). By definition, if I can’t double spend, I can’t triple spend,
quadruple spend, etc.
62 For an explanation of bitcoin software development, see Lopp [2018].
63 For more discussion on some of these potential attacks, see Antonopoulos [2017, 253-
256] and Ammous [2018, 241-251].
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is no worse o for not helping us draw additional conclusions. But, even
so, we could easily supplement the model in ways that would make it nat-
ural to value breadworld bread as a scarce commodity just like many now
value bitcoin as a scarce commodity. First, a small circular economy might
develop among enthusiasts where someone might sell, say, pizza for a spec-
ified amount of breadworld bread. Second, it costs money to publish bread-
world chapters in the very same way that it costs money to mine bitcoin.
This might help set a price floor in the market for breadworld bread. And,
third, as people begin to respect its other properties (divisibility, scarcity,
censorship-resistance), the small circle of enthusiasts might grow to include
more enthusiasts, speculators, traders, and so on, increasing demand. So
although the model ocially includes none of these claims, it could. But
their absence in the model doesn’t count against it, given its original pur-
pose.
The breadworld and bitcoin networks function similarly and produce a
similar product. That product, in each case, is a story about a highly di-
visible substance with no real-world correlate. Often, what holds for bread
holds for bitcoin. And, in many cases, the model breadworld network spec-
ifies a type of which something in the bitcoin network is an instance, a sign
of successful modeling noted by Williamson [2017, 160]. I’ve specified the
model’s components generally by their roles without pinpointing specific
role-players. We can map these roles onto specific players in the bitcoin








Table 1: From breadworld roles to bitcoin role-players
These parallels reveal that the dierences in description between the bread-
world and bitcoin networks often reside more in specificity than in anything
else. In fact, the breadworld label for a component often better captures
the essence of the corresponding component within the bitcoin network
by describing its functional role. This is important because the bitcoin
network can evolve by swapping in new components for older ones. The
network survives these changes by preserving its components’ functional
roles. If bitcoin survives long enough, future users might even recognize
bitcoin more easily in my model than in my description of bitcoin itself.
A number of important parallels remain. Both breadworld sentences
and entries on the bitcoin ledger are chunks of language. Full nodes func-
tion as referees on the network, rejecting chunks of language which don’t
pass muster and validating those which do. Miners function as competitive
publishers; they bundle chunks of linguistic material and disseminate it over
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the network. And so on. The table below highlights the most important
parallels between the real and imagined networks:
Category Breadworld Bitcoin
main character bread bitcoin
smallest unit crumb satoshi
smallest unit x 100,000,000 loaf bitcoin
username address address
username access password private key
published item submission transaction
verified statement bundle chapter block
series of verified bundles book blockchain
verifier referee full node
distributor publisher miner
Table 2: Mapping from Breadworld to Bitcoin
Now, I don’t mean to suggest that we may simply choose to apply the word
‘referee’ to full nodes, ‘publisher’ to miners, and so on like we might fool-
ishly use ‘God’ to refer to the “triumphal march of history.”64 I mean quite
literally that full nodes are referees because they referee and that miners re-
ally are publishers because they publish. The bitcoin blockchain is a digital
book. The thousands of people daily “sending bitcoin” really are coauthor-
ing on a massive scale without a central authority. It is by far the largest
and longest-running case of hyperauthorship in human history.
With few exceptions, what goes for bread goes for bitcoin. This holds
especially in the parallels between breadworld sentences and bitcoin trans-
actions, despite the dierence noted earlier between bitcoin’s UTXO system
and breadworld’s account system. Just as a breadworld sentence describes
the movement of bread and is not itself a movement of bread, a bitcoin
transaction describes a transfer of bitcoin without being that transfer of bit-
coin. Hence, in an important sense, calling this chunk of code a “trans-
action” conflates use and mention by identifying a chunk of language that
describes an event with the event itself. In both the breadworld and bit-
coin stories, we use chunks of linguistic items to represent movements of
fictional substances that are not themselves linguistic items.
If the chunk of code in the bitcoin blockchain that describes a move-
ment of bitcoin is not itself that movement, where does the movement,
the transaction, take place? Nowhere—or everywhere, depending on how
you think of it. If bread’s movements are fictional, so, too, are bitcoin’s
movements across addresses as described in the digital book of bitcoin.
Furthermore, nothing beyond our representation of bitcoin has bitcoin’s
properties. Since the bitcoin blockchain represents the fictional movements
of a substance that is no more real than breadworld bread, we have every
reason to treat bitcoin and breadworld bread similarly. Hence, like bread-
world bread, bitcoin is a fictional substance or at the very least, a merely
intentional object.
64 Lewis [1986, 140].
31
Now, many falsely claim that bitcoin is code, which would imply that
something beyond our representation of bitcoin does have the properties
we attribute to bitcoin.65 Saying that bitcoin is code is like saying that
Sherlock is the name ‘Sherlock’ or that he is the class of sentences that
mention him or something similarly confused. Sherlock is not a word or
a class of sentences. Unlike any word or class of sentences, Sherlock is a
British detective. Similarly, no portion of code has bitcoin’s properties. If
I send you five satoshis, I don’t send five symbols or even five strings of
symbols—that isn’t how bitcoin works. There aren’t even chunks of code
with which we could identify each satoshi. Satoshis don’t have traceable
identifiers like vehicle identification numbers. The protocol only settles
an address’s amount of unspent bitcoin and the immediate source of that
bitcoin. Nothing in the bitcoin blockhain corresponds to each bitcoin or
satoshi. And whereas bitcoin divides into satoshis and not symbols, code
divides into symbols and not satoshis. By Leibniz’s Law, then, bitcoin is not
code. Neither code nor anything else has bitcoin’s properties. So we have
every reason to treat bitcoin on a par with breadworld bread and Sherlock
Holmes.
In review, our modeling strategy has revealed bitcoin to be a fictional
substance in an on-going and massively coauthored book on a network
that automates and decentralizes the stages leading to publication. Im-
portantly, bitcoin isn’t just a fictional substance, but a fictional substance
valued as a commodity and whose ownership amounts to real life access to
cryptographically secure private keys. So the story encoded in the bitcoin
blockchain also serves as a trustworthy public ledger for unspent balances
across all addresses. When we conceive of bitcoin in this way, the Coordi-
nation, Corruption, and Credit Problems for hyperauthorship take on new
meaning.
The Coordination Problem concerns not just how we hyperauthor ef-
fectively without a central auhority, but how we achieve consensus about
how much of a valuable commodity everyone has without trusting vulnera-
ble central authorities. The Corruption Problem morphs into the problem
of how to secure the integrity of that ledger against incompetence, malfea-
sance, and other potential risks. Finally, the Credit Problem no longer
merely concerns how to assign credit for writing a valid chunk of code but
now also how to assign ownership, or, in the accounting sense of the term,
how to tell who has credited whom. This close relationship between author-
ship and ownership might tempt us once more into thinking that the coin
that’s owned is part of the code that’s authored. But I hope that the pains
I’ve taken in this paper will help us resist this temptation. Coin owned is
not code authored.66
65 Usually, authors say that bitcoins or satoshis are “chains of digital signatures.” I say
more about this claim in the conclusion. Here is a somewhat representative sample:
Van Valkenburgh [2014, 9], Lastra and Allen [2018, 55], Akins et al. [2014, 30 n. 30],
Wu et al. [2017, 3124], Kroll et al. [2013, 3], Gao et al. [2018, 27207], Zhang [2017,
560], Friedlmaier et al. [2018, 2].
66 What, then, does it mean to own a cryptocurrency? This is an open and complicated
question with important legal consequences. See Hinkes [2019], Sutherland [2019],
and Stabile et al. [2020].
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7 Conclusion
We began with questions about what bitcoin is and how it works. With
a model meant to serve as an accessible on-ramp for understanding bit-
coin’s complexities, we have answered both questions more or less simulta-
neously. Bitcoin is a fictional substance that appears in a digital book, the
blockchain, secured by a network that decentralizes the jobs of refereeing
and publishing. Still, bitcoin has unexplored depths that we cannot possi-
bly examine in a single paper. My account of bitcoin itself raises questions
that we must save for another time.
First, since bitcoin mining is a form of publishing, questions about the
freedoms of the press loom nearby. But bitcoin mining complicates these
issues about the freedom to publish because the on-going publication gener-
ates a non-sovereign form of money. This connection between mining and
the freedom of the press deserves further exploration.
Second, since bitcoin is a fictional substance and not code, it isn’t any
particular kind of code. Consequently, no bitcoin is a “chain of digital
signatures,” a conclusion which appears to contradict Satoshi’s definition
of electronic coins in the bitcoin whitepaper.67 Unfortunately, this defini-
tion continues to appear with little or no qualification in a steady stream
of academic papers, government documents, and arguments about which
cryptocurrency is the real bitcoin. How, then, should we understand the
definition?68
Finally, how, if it all, does bitcoin’s fictional status dierentiate it from
fiat currencies like the U.S. dollar? As I argue elsewhere, I think not much.69
Typically, what signifies isn’t identical to what is signified. So a $20 bill is
not itself the quantity of twenty dollars that the bill signifies. So a $1 bill is
not itself the quantity of one dollar that the bill signifies either. But what are
these things, the dollars, that bills signify? They are quantities of a fictional
substance, in my view. Bitcoin diers from the dollar, however, in a crucial
way. Whether a financial instrument successfully signifies dollars heavily
depends on whether the U.S. government says it does. But no centralized
body has similar control over bitcoin.
67 Nakamoto [2008, 2].
68 I answer this question in Warmke (ms).
69 Warmke (ms). Thanks to Martin Peterson for discussion on this point.
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